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Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, economic instruments have gained much ground relative to com-
mand-and-control mechanisms for the promotion of environmental policies, based on the view
that incentive-based tools, directed towards voluntary means of reducing negative environmental
externalities, are flexible and economically more efficient. Such was the reasoning behind the
establishment by the 1996 Farm Act of the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), a
voluntary conservation program providing assistance to farmers facing threats to their natural
resource base. EQIP’s main efficiency-enhancing features are (i) a bidding mechanism where
farmers compete for funds based on their “bids” (proposals) for the provision of environmental
services, and (ii) the targeting of funds to specific resource concerns – such as soil erosion, nutri-
ent management, water resources management, and wildlife habitat conservation – aimed at
achieving the greatest possible environmental benefits per dollar of program expenditure. These
are innovative features relative to previous programs, which allocated funds on a first-come,
first-served basis, according to political jurisdiction. EQIP’s innovative approach is of particular
interest given the trend towards agri-environmental payments in the debate for the upcoming
Farm Bill.
This paper moves to close an apparent gap in the empirical work on incentive-based envi-
ronmental programs. A sizeable literature exists that tests the efficiency of various such pro-
grams, focusing primarily on their use to tackle point source pollution, and particularly on trad-
able permits systems (OECD, 1999; Jensen and Rasmussen, 2000; Schwarze and Zapfel, 2000;
Brännlund et al., 1998). On the other hand, few empirical analyses have so far focused on the use
of economic instruments to curb non-point source pollution (Johnsen, 1993; Malik et al., 1994).3
Cost- sharing and incentive payments are special cases of economic incentives for environ-
mental policy and natural resource conservation. Cost-sharing covers some or all of the start- up
and/or installation costs of implementing management practices that reduce natural resource deg-
radation, while incentive payments are monetary incentives used to encourage farmers to initiate
improved practices. These two approaches are very similar in that they provide farmers with an
incentive to voluntarily adopt less polluting technologies as opposed to non-voluntary mecha-
nisms such as taxing degrading activities or setting standards governing farmers’ land manage-
ment practices. The main draw back of cost-sharing and incentive payments is the welfare cost
associated with the opportunity cost of public funds and by possibly introducing price distor-
tions. The first-best economic incentive is a corrective tax on the undesired externality, or limit-
ing the aggregate amount of externality and allowing trades between agents; however, monitor-
ing costs and institutional complexity required by tax or permit schemes often make cost-sharing
and incentive payments the preferred option from a practical standpoint.  For  previous empirical
work on cost-sharing and incentive payments see Cooper and Keim (1996),  Lichtenberg and
Lessley (1991), and  Madariaga (1987).  A theoretical analysis of optimal cost-sharing arrange-
ments is provided by Malik and Shoemaker (1993).
The analysis of EQIP’s performance enables us to assess some of the problems faced in the
implementation phase of an incentive-based program. The implementation of EQIP is particu-
larly interesting because it deals with the diffuse environmental impacts of agricultural activities
by (i) trying to elicit the farmers’ willingness-to-accept payments for undertaking conservation
practices, and (ii) allowing for funding of a broad set of conservation practices thereby leaving
flexibility to farmers to target natural resource concerns. More specifically, the objective of this
paper is to understand the reasons behind the apparently high number of contracts (17% of total)4
involving withdrawal, after signing, of one or more practices. The paper is structured as follows:
the next section provides a brief introduction to EQIP’s implementation, and the third section
describes the extent of contract withdrawals. We then continue by presenting the model describ-
ing farmers’ incentives to apply for a contract and then withdrawing. In the final section, the
model estimation is performed and discussed.
How is EQIP implemented?
The funding mechanism adopted by EQIP relies on the definition of priority areas defined at
the watershed level, or around areas of special environmental sensitivity or presenting significant
natural resource concerns. These concerns could include soil erosion, decline in water quality
and availability, loss of wildlife habitat, and degradation of wetlands, and forest and grazing
lands. These priority areas are identified on an annual basis, through a locally led participatory
conservation process.
EQIP’s principal objective is to achieve the greatest possible environmental benefits per dol-
lar of program expenditure The objectives of the program are achieved by requiring farmers to
implement a conservation plan that may include a combination of structural, vegetative, and land
management practices. All EQIP-funded activities must be carried out according to an approved
conservation plan explaining what changes in farming practices are expected and how these
changes address primary natural resource concerns in the area. EQIP relies on a bidding frame-
work whereby the farmers propose a cost-share level for the practices they intend to undertake as
part of their conservation plan. An "offer index" is calculated for each proposal by considering
the environmental benefits and the total cost-share request.
Local work groups evaluate and rank proposals from producers based on a point system.
Ranking points are determined numerically according to the general guidelines provided at the5
state level. Each resource concern has an associated maximum point value. The rankings have
been developed so that the greater the expected benefit, the greater the point value for that prac-
tice or structure.
1 The "offer index" is calculated for each proposal by dividing the total cost-
share request by the number of ranking points obtained. Proposals are most likely to be funded if
they address crucial resource concerns, furthermore, the “offer index” mechanism also takes
government costs into consideration by ranking the proposals with a low offer index as most pre-
ferred. This means that proposals providing the same benefits for the least amount will be f a-
vored.
Agricultural producers not located in priority areas are eligible to receive funds from a
separate state allocation budget if their conservation plan addresses statewide environmental
concerns.
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The EQIP program was authorized at $1.3 billion over the seven-year period of FY 1996
through FY 2002, with annual amounts of $200 million per year.
3 Based on an economic analy-
sis performed by NRCS to assess the potential impacts of EQIP, assuming the level of funding
authorized by the 1996 Act, an estimated 35.7 million acres of agricultural land would be treated
over the seven years of the program, including 18.5 million acres of cropland, 3.7 million acres
of pasture, and 13.5 million acres of rangeland (Federal Register, 1997). Table 1 presents the
contractual obligations underwritten by the government and the acreage covered by these con-
tracts both in terms of farmland and of cropland. With a total of nearly 35 million acres of farm-
                                                
1 Conceptually this is similar to the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) used to rank the proposals for the Conser-
vation Reserve Program (CRP). The main difference between the two is that the EBI is more structured and trans-
parent in how it functions, while the EQIP ranking methods favor locally-driven criteria under the oversight of the
NRCS State Conservationist.
2 At least 65 percent of the funds are to be used in designated priority areas and up to 35 percent can be used for
other significant statewide natural resource concerns.6
land already under contract the, the goal of 35.7 million acres set out at the inception of the pro-
gram has nearly been reached two years ahead of time.
Table 1. Overview of EQIP contractual obligations: the first four years
1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Number of Contracts 24,512 20,722 19,805 16,204 81,243
Contract Obligations (Millions $) 175 155 142 131 603
Farm Acres (Millions of Acres) 8.641 9.402 9.188 7.657 34.888
Cropland Acres (Millions of Acres) 2.605 2.300 2.155 1.818 8.878
The share of projects dealing explicitly with cropland, whether addressing soil erosion or
other resource management issues, appears to be lower than initially anticipated.  Of the 35 mil-
lion acres already under contract only 8.9 million appear to be cropland. Even though the total
acres of farmland being brought into the program are greater than expected, the lower proportion
of cropland means the program will probably not reach by 2002 the initial estimate of 18.5 mil-
lion acres of cropland. This factor is significant given that in the benefit-cost analysis performed
by NRCS cropland played a major role in computing the benefits of the program: benefits were
estimated at $1651 million for cropland, $324 million for pasture, and. $438 million for range-
land, respectively (based on acreage projections mentioned above and excluding any benefits
from conservation practices for treatment of animal waste).
4
                                                                                                                                                            
3 The funding for the initial interim year was of $130 million. During the interim administration period in FY 1996
the $130 million were used to continue implementation of the terms and conditions of the superseded programs to
the extent that such terms and conditions were consistent with the statutory provisions of EQIP.
4 The total discounted present value of benefits for EQIP (excluding any benefits from conservation practices for
treatment of animal waste) amount to $2.41 billion while the present value of total discounted costs, both public and
private, are estimated at $1.65 billion.7
EQIP contracts: full performance vs. withdrawal of conservation practices
The main objective of this paper is to provide insight into the practical implementation of EQIP,
and especially to understand the reasons behind the apparently high rate of withdrawal of con-
tracted conservation practices by participating farmers. EQIP’s framework, by combining a bid-
ding process with the prioritization among natural resource concerns, would appear to be an effi-
cient mechanism for allocating the limited funds available for natural resource conservation;
however, once proposals are approved and a contract signed, approximately 11% of the conser-
vation practices in the conservation plan never get implemented. Of the 215,000 conservation
practices scheduled to be implemented in the 1997-2000 period, 24,299 were withdrawn after a
contract was signed (see first row in Table 2).
Number of Practices withdrawn in a contract Total
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10




0<ws<0.10 337 17 2 356
0.10< ws <0.20 1155 187 21 6 4 3 1376
0.20< ws <0.30 486 295 86 39 24 9 4 1 1 945
0.30< ws <0.40 647 369 171 79 32 30 18 11 1 5 1 1364
0.40< ws <0.50 954 288 199 102 63 33 25 18 5 10 15 1712
0.50< ws <0.60 46 22 36 8 10 13 4 7 146
0.60< ws <0.70 277 85 77 22 19 18 9 6 7 15 535
0.70< ws <0.80 88 60 38 19 8 12 5 3 20 253
0.80< ws <0.90 33 17 8 9 9 3 12 91




































ws = 1.0 1622 875 480 314 144 97 48 37 27 21 32 3697
Total Contracts by # of
CPs withdrawn
52237 5201 2308 1132 723 382 263 137 106 67 58 120 62734
Table 2. Number of conservation practices (CPs) by share of contract withdrawn (ws) and
by number of withdrawn CPs.
One can observe that the number of practices withdrawn from a contract varies substantially,
ranging from zero to more than 10 practices being withdrawn from a same contract. Out of8
62,734 contracts, 10,497 contracts were involved in the withdrawal of one or more of the conser-
vation practices approved according to the conservation plan (17% of contracts). The resulting
disconnect between the expected social benefits as approved in the conservation plan and the
ones arising from the practices actually being implemented can be highly relevant in the overall
evaluation of EQIP as a program.
From Table 2 one can observe that nearly 3,697 contracts (6% of total) were withdrawn
in full (ws=1.0). This drop-out rate is puzzling given the voluntary nature of the program and the
considerable transaction costs involved in preparing a conservation plan, bidding, and finalizing
a contract. Did farmers underestimate the contractual burden compared to business-as-usual fi-
nancial assistance? If so, has this phenomenon decreased over time? Are some farmers bidding
too low?
At the other extreme, there are a substantial number of contracts involving withdrawal of
conservation practices where still most practices in the conservation plan are performed. For ex-
ample, there are 2,677 contracts (involving withdrawals) for which 70% or more of the proposed
practices are implemented (ws<0.3). An interesting research topic, pursued in this paper, is
whether, taking into account all other relevant factors, certain types of conservation practices are
being dropped more than other practices once the conservation plan is approved. This would be
consistent with rational behavior if some conservation practices increase the probability of ac-
ceptance in the program of the conservation plan. Addressing these questions is important when
considering that the funds allocated to withdrawn contracts are lost to the program. This raises
the question of whether EQIP is in fact achieving the stated objective of obtaining the greatest
possible environmental benefit per dollar used, especially in light of the fact that 17% of the9
contracts, by not being implemented in full, are not providing the benefits intended when the
conservation plan was approved.
Model Specification
In the economic model adopted here we focus on two aspects of the EQIP implementation
process: (i) each producer when presenting a conservation plan for approval tries to maximize
the expected private benefits he/she will obtain, and (ii) once a contract is approved we assume
that for every proposed conservation practice the producer will compute private benefits and
costs and decide whether to implement the practice.
Given EQIP’s selection criteria, the producer can control which conservation practices (CP)
to propose and at what cost-share level. These two variables will determine the producer’s ex-
pected benefits of a proposal. Neglecting the uncertainty surrounding the actual benefits and
costs of  conservation practices, we decompose the problem as follows:  let the Net Benefitij for
producer i and practice j be defined as
ij ij ij ij Cost Estimated offlevel Benefit Private Gross Benefit Net ￿ - - = ) 1 (        (1)
where  ij Benefit Net  is the benefit to the producer after accounting for the practice’s costs and
ij offlevel which is the proposed cost-share level.
The benefit from each conservation practice, however, is conditional on the approval of the
conservation plan as a whole. We can assume that the probability of approval, Papp, will depend
on the type of practices proposed (CPij, a dichotomous variable representing whether practice j is10
present in the conservation plan), on the cost-share requested (offlvli), and on factors outside of
the producer’s control (EXT). Then we have that the total expected benefits can be written as:
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Once a contract has been approved and signed the producer’s decision problem becomes a
different one: since there is no penalty for opting out of implementing a specific conservation
practice, each conservation practice is analyzed separately and a decision is made based on bene-
fits and cost.
5 This implies that a practice that may have been attractive because it increased the
probability of approval, either by its very nature or because of a low cost-share request, may not
be viable.
 In this second stage, let wij be the decision by producer i to withdraw from conservation
practice j. Since wij can take on only two possible values, the stochastic behavior of wij is de-
scribed by the probability of a positive response,  ) | 1 ( X = ij w P , which is here taken to depend
on a vector-valued variable  Xrepresenting the benefits and cost components of a practice, and
socio-economic characteristics of the producer. Assuming producers weigh benefits and costs for
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where negative net benefits lead to withdrawal. In what follows we assume that Net_Benefitij is
related to X linearly (as in eq. [1]) with an additive random component,
                                                
5 EQIP contracts contain a "liquidated damages" provision, providing for payment from the producer to the govern-
ment of a certain fixed amount in the event of a breach (actual damages from the breach being extremely difficult to
ascertain). However, we are unaware of the application this clause in practice by FSA. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that the expected penalty of a breach is negligible.11
e a + ￿ + = ij ij Benefit Net X ß
then outcome probabilities are determined by
) 0 ( ) | 1 ( < + ￿ + = = e a ij ij P w P X ß X                                                                  (3)
Three common specifications of the probability model are the linear probability model, the probit
model, and the logit model. The logit specification was employed in this study (Amemiya, 1981;
Theil,1972).
6 Specifically, the logit is defined as the natural logarithmic value of the odds in fa-


















log                                                                                 (4)
where:  Producers   n i , , 2 , 1 K =
Conservation practices m j , , 2 , 1 K =
Pij is the conditional probability of a conservation practice being withdrawn given
The knowledge of Xij,
Xij are a set of producer characteristics, contracted conservation practices, cost-
share level and other factors influencing the benefit-cost considerations
ß is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
Data Description and Empirical Analysis
Data for the analysis, which spans from 1997 to the end of fiscal year 2000, was provided by the
Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) the USDA agency in charge of administering
EQIP. As part of administering the program, NRCS collects an extensive amount of data on the
conservation plans submitted by producers, on the cost-share requested in the bids, and, for
approved contracts, the implementation of practices, total costs, and the dollar amount disbursed
by EQIP. The data comprising 224,000 observations for approved conservation practices were12
taken from an electronic database maintained jointly by NRCS and the Farm Services Agency
(FSA). After accounting for inconsistencies and missing values 215,136 observations remained
that could be used for the analysis. An observation is constituted by a conservation practice
associated with a specific contract and producer and includes the cost of the practice, the offer
level, and the FIPS code identifying the farm location by county. Variables are also available
identifying the extent of the practice to be performed according to the appropriate units of
measurement, the farmland involved, the amount of cropland involved, whether the contract is
linked to livestock production, and finally whether there are multiple producers associated with a
contract.
From the model presented in the previous section we are interested in both the expected
total benefits from presenting a conservation plan and the net benefits stemming from imple-
menting a single conservation practice. Unfortunately the expected total benefits could not be
computed. The reason is that detailed data is kept only for contracts that are approved; therefore,
the probability of acceptance of a conservation plan cannot be estimated since no data are avail-
able concerning practices proposed, total cost, and offer level for conservation plans that were
not approved. On the other hand, data on cost of practices and offer levels of approved contracts
are available since they are recorded in the contracts. This means that we will not be able to test
directly whether including certain conservation practice in a proposal will increase the expected
total benefits. However, we will be able to test this hypothesis indirectly by seeing if certain
types of practices are consistently dropped after approval.
                                                                                                                                                            
6 The logit model was selected primarily because the majority of the independent variables in our model are di-
chotomous which results in data being concentrated in the tails and in the probability distribution resembling a lo-
gistic function.13
As mentioned above, the cost data is available; however, the private benefit to the farmer
is not observable. While we know there must be private benefits, since EQIP does not allow for
full refunds, the question is what variables can be used as proxies for them. We assume, follow-
ing the USDA cost-benefit analysis procedure for assessing EQIP performance, that the amount
of farmland and the amount of cropland involved in a contract are directly related with benefits.
We also assume that different practices provide benefits of different magnitude to the producer.
Incorporating these changes, we perform a logit estimation of the form
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and the basic equation used in the logistic regression is:
e b b
b b b b b
+ ￿ + ￿ +
￿ + + ￿ + ￿ + =
SCHEDYR ESTCOST
OFFLVL CRPSHR FMLD PRACTYPE Benefit Net
6 5
4 3 2 1 0        (6)
where PRACTYPE is a categorical variable that indicates the type of technical practice involved,
FMLD is the amount of farmland (in hundreds of acres), and CRPSHR is the portion of farmland
in crops covered by the contract (in percentage terms). The above equation is a bare bones for-
mulation that takes into consideration only the variables in Eq. [1]. Three alternative formula-
tions were also estimated to test the hypotheses that some practices may be added on just to ob-
tain approval of the conservation plan, and to take into account the socio-economic conditions of
the producers involved in the contracts. In Table 3 we present the full set of independent vari-
ables hypothesized to affect the probability of withdrawal from implementing a conservation
practice.
The inclusion of SCHEDYR among benefits and costs is meant to capture how the pro-
ducers’ perception of benefits and costs may change over the lifetime of the program, represent-14
ing in some way the learning curve associated with participating in a new program.
7 With this
interpretation one would expect a decrease in the probability of withdrawal over time.




    Soil & Land Mng ?
    Water Management ?
    Livestock Nutrients ?
    Crop Nutrients ?
    Habitat -
    Other Practices
Categorical variable specifying broad types of conserva-
tion practices based on the NRCS definition for each
practice
?




CRPSHR Share of FMLND that is in crops % -
Costs
OFFLVL Cost-share requested for practice % -
COST Total estimated cost per practice 10
3 $ +





    Practice number=1
    Practice number: 2-3 +
    Practice number: 4-7 +
    Practice number >8
Categorical variable indicating total number of practices
specified in a contract
+
HABT_G3 Dummy variable for habitat conservation practices in-
cluded in contracts that contain more than three practices
+
MULTPRD Multiple Producers  (=1 if more than one producer is
listed in the contract)
?
Producer Characteristics
LIVSTPRD Livestock Producers (=1 if  livestock producer) ?
REGION
    Northern Crescent ?
    Northern Plains ?
    Prairie Gateway ?
    Eastern Uplands ?
    Southern Seabord ?
    Fruitful Rim ?
    Basin & Range ?
    Mississippi Portal
Location of producer according to ERS Farm Resource
Regions used to capture the socio-economic variation in
the sample.
?
Table 3. Independent Variables for Logistic Regression
                                                
7 The variable SCHEDYR may also pick up variation over time of the economic condition of producers, however,
this is unlikely because change in producer income was not monotonic in the period going from 1997 to 2000.15
In Table 4 we present the results for the basic logistic regression, and alternative formulations
that take into consideration the characteristics of a contract, and the socio-economic conditions
of producers.  The results are presented as 
ß e because  the exponentiated form conveys the
change in odds (as a multiplicative effect) that each independent variable has on the chances of
withdrawal from a conservation practice. Column (1) of Table 4 presents the results for the basic
regression. The categorical variable PRACTYPE proved to be significant as a categorical vari-
able at the 1% level, and when it is decomposed into k-1 dummy variables (Soil & Land man-
agement was dropped) the only coefficient that was not significantly different from zero was that
for “Livestock nutrient management”. The coefficient for WATER MANAGEMENT is 1.0461
and means that if a conservation practice is classified as a water management practice the odds of
withdrawal will increase by 4.6% relative to the unweighted average odds of the sample. The
striking result to come out of this basic regression, and to be confirmed by the alternative for-
mulations, is the 26% higher odds of HABITAT conservation practices to be withdrawn (1%
significance level). This result appears to confirm the hypothesis that some practices may be at-
tractive in the proposal stage but not in the implementation phase because of low private bene-
fits. Also interesting, are the substantially lower odds of withdrawal for crop nutrient manage-
ment practices (-18%) which indicate higher private returns in those practices that also are con-
sidered to have the highest social returns in USDA’s benefit-cost analysis. Farmland (FMLND)
and the share of cropland (CRPSHR) are both highly significant and with the expected sign;
however, even though they do reflect greater benefits, it appears from the limited impact on the
odds of withdrawal (less than1%) that the extent of the practice is less important to producers
than the type of practice in determining whether to implement a practice. The odds of withdrawal
decrease by 2% for every additional 1000 acres involved in a conservation practice, and similarly16
for the share of land in crops a 2% decrease in odds is encountered for an increase of  10 per-
centage points implying greater private benefits associated with practices linked to cropland. At
first glance it would appear that the same observation can be made of the cost-share requested
(OFFLVL) which is also highly significant but with an impact of only 1% ; however, considering
the range of variation in the cost-share requests (from 20% to 80%), a one-to-one relationship on
the withdrawal odds would have a considerable impact (for example, an increase in the OFFLVL
from 50% to 70% would decrease the odds of withdrawal by 20%). On the cost side the result is
quite surprising to the extent that COST is significant at the 1% level but with an opposite sign
from that expected. This may indicate that given the heterogeneity of practices inside our broad
classification, even accounting for these broad classes, the more costly practices inside our broad
categories may be the ones with higher returns and therefore preferred. Finally, the scheduled
year of implementation (SCHEDYR) is highly significant and shows a 19% decrease in the odds
of withdrawal for every additional year since the inception of the program indicating that a
greater number of contracts were cancelled at the beginning of EQIP as part of a learning curve
associated with the innovations introduced by the program.
In the second regression, the total number of conservation practices contracted in a single
contract (PRNUM) was added in the equation. The rationale behind the inclusion of this variable
is that if practices are being added to increase the probability of acceptance of the conservation
plan to then be dropped in the implementation phase then this should reflect as a higher prob-
ability of withdrawal if a practice is part of a contract with many other practices.
8 The results for
PRNUM are presented as the impact on the odds relative to contracts with only one practice.
9
                                                
8 This is not to be confused with the fact that contracts with more practices will have by default a higher probability
of having at least one withdrawal.
9 Indicator contrasts were used for PRNUM which compare each group of the categorical variable to a reference
category that is excluded (in our case Practice Number=1).17
The findings indicate a very large and significant impact with the expected sign: if a practice
belongs to a contract with a total of two to three practices the odds of withdrawal increase by
26% relative to the case where it is the only practice in the contract. This rises to 61% if the
practice belongs to a contract with eight or more practices. Adding PRNUM as an additional in-
dependent variable does not affect the significance or the magnitude of the coefficients indicat-
ing that the results of the basic regression are robust.
In the third regression, we add two dummy variables: (i) HABT_G3 tests for the rele-
vance towards withdrawal of habitat practices in contracts with 4 or more contracts, and (ii)
MULTPRD indicates whether the fact that a conservation practice belonging to a contract in-
volving multiple producers has an impact on the probability of withdrawal. Given the very big
impact of HABITAT in the previous two regressions, HABT_G3 is introduced to further refine
our hypothesis that some conservation practices are simply add-ons to improve the probability of
acceptance. Since we are already controlling for habitat and for the number of practices in a
contract, the presence of HABT_G3 tests the possibility that the habitat practices that are being
withdrawn have a stronger presence in contracts with a large number of practices. This is indeed
the case: HABT_G3 is significant at the 5% level and indicates that the odds of withdrawal for
habitat practices in large contracts are 13% above those for other habitat practices. One should
note that introducing HABT_G3 as an additional variable has an impact, as would be expected,
on the coefficient of HABITAT, which is reduced from 27% to 17%.18
Basic      with contract characteristics All regressors
Variable Name   (1)          (2)         (3)              (4)
PRACTYPE (0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
     Water Management 1.0461 1.0437 1.0594           1.0885
(0.001) ** (0.002) ** (0.009) **           (0.000)
     Livestock Nutrients 0.9751 0.9940 1.0109           1.0489
(0.321) (0.813) (0.681)            (0.081)
     Crop Nutrients 0.8227 0.8074 0.8193            0.7973
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
     Habitat 1.2645 1.2721 1.1777           1.1181
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.004) **
     Other 0.9506 0.9346 0.9496           0.9600
(0.002)** (0.000) ** (0.004) **           (0.023)*
FMLND 0.9989 0.9987 0.9987           0.9983
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
CROPSH 0.9969 0.9973 0.9972           0.9980
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
OFFLVL 0.9911 0.9907 0.9907           0.9911
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
COST 0.9836 0.9884 0.9883           0.9888
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
SCHEDYR 0.8128 0.8153 0.8150           0.8075
(0.000) ** (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
PRNUM (0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
     Practice number: 2-3 1.2634 1.2644           1.2897
(0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
     Practice number: 4-7 1.2960 1.2817           1.3024
(0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
     Practice number >8 1.6107 1.5922           1.6074
(0.000) ** (0.000) **           (0.000) **
HABT_G3 1.1362           1.1290
(0.018)*           (0.025)*
MULTPRD 0.9399           0.9522
(0.017)*           (0.064)
LIVSTPRD           0.9094
          (0.000) **
REGION           (0.000) **
    Northern Crescent           0.8935
          (0.000) **
    Northern Plains           0.8923
          (0.000) **
    Prairie Gateway           1.4105
          (0.000) **
    Eastern Uplands           0.8873
          (0.000) **
    Southern Seabord           1.1746
          (0.000) **
    Fruitful Rim           1.0254
          (0.276)
    Basin & Range           0.9270
          (0.004) **
    Mississippi Portal           1.1049
          (0.000) **
Model P
2 2087 2472 2483 3240
Probability 0.0000 (df 10) 0.0000 (df 13) 0.0000 (df 15) 0.0000 (df 23)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.030
Numbers in parentheses are significance levels: single and double asterisks indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 4. Parameters Estimates of Factors Affecting Conservation Practice Withdrawal19
   The impact of MULTPRD in regression (3) indicates a statistically significant 6% de-
crease in the odds of withdrawal. The logic behind the possible impact of MULTPRD was that
organizational complications stemming from multiple producer contracts might increase the odds
of withdrawal. However, it appears not to be the case, and this can be interpreted to mean that
higher transaction costs associated with putting together multi-producer contracts leads to lower
withdrawal rates if the contract is approved.
In the final regression, we tried to include producers’ socio-economic characteristics that
are independent of EQIP procedures but that may affect the probability of withdrawal. These
were whether the producer contracting a practice is a livestock producer (LIVSTPRD) and the
location of the farm according to the Economic Research Service’s Farm Resource Region clas-
sification. The Farm Resource Regions are used here as a proxy for a set of variables encom-
passing type of commodities produced, natural resource constraints, and general economic con-
ditions that may differ from one area to another. An important finding emerges from the regres-
sion: LIVSTPRD is highly significant indicating that if a practice is contracted by livestock pro-
ducers the odds of withdrawal are 9% lower relative to the same practice being contracted to
non-livestock producers. The relevance of this result arises from the fact that by law EQIP must
explicitly channel at least 50% of funds to livestock-related practices. The reliability, in con-
tractual terms, of livestock producers is therefore good news for EQIP and for environmental is-
sues arising from livestock production since EQIP is the only conservation provision targeting
livestock producers.
     Introducing the distinction between location of producers in different regions is highly sig-
nificant for all regions except the Fruitful Rim. Relative to the unweighted average odds of the
sample the location of the producer has a considerable impact on the odds of withdrawal of a20
practice. The impact ranges from a 41% increase in the odds of withdrawal for producers in the
Prairie Gateway to an 11% decrease for those in the Northern Crescent, Northern Plains, and
Eastern Uplands. Interestingly, introducing this additional information alters only slightly the
coefficients of the independent variables included in the previous regressions confirming the ro-
bustness of the results concerning our hypotheses about the characteristics of EQIP as a program
that may be leading to high withdrawal rates.
In all four regressions the Likelihood ratio test indicated that the amount of variation ex-
plained by the model was significantly different from zero beyond the 1% level. However, the
overall goodness-of-fit for the model is to be considered poor with a Nagelkerke-R
2 of only two
to three percent. Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test rejects the hypothesis that the
models fitted generated the data. The poor fit is probably attributable to the unbalanced nature of
the sample shares of the two outcomes: although 24,300 conservation practices were withdrawn,
this represents only 11% of the sample.
Conclusions
The conclusion one may draw from the results is that multiple factors contributed to the con-
siderable withdrawal rate of approved conservation practices. Some factors, such as socio-
economic conditions of the producers are external to the administration of the EQIP program;
however, others relate directly to the EQIP’s financing mechanism and the incentives that the
program creates. A temporary effect which had a considerable effect is that a greater number of
contracts were cancelled at the beginning of EQIP as part of a learning curve associated with the
innovations introduced by the program. This effect has decreased over time but is important from
a program evaluation standpoint given the relatively short authorization intervals of government
programs (4-6 years).21
Structural components of the program that may be leading to withdrawal from conservation
practices are a reason of concern:
(i)  low cost-share requests that may arise from the bidding process tend to have a higher
withdrawal rate;
(ii)  the possibility to opt out of a conservation practice once the conservation plan has
been approved creates an incentive to include practices in the conservation plan that
will increase the probability of approval but may not be viable in the implementation
stage. This appears to be particularly true for habitat-related practices;
(iii)  related to the previous point, the approval process creates incentives to propose a
broad conservation plan with many practices; however, it appears that if a conserva-
tion practice belongs to a contract with many other practices the odds of its with-
drawal are higher.
In a broader policy context, the EQIP program is a flexible, voluntary program that has been
very successful with producers (with current funding only 32% of applications were a p-
proved) because it does not require to take land out of production as is done by other USDA
programs (CRP, WRP, and WHIP). However, the flexibility that makes EQIP a successful
program creates the shortcomings listed above. The problem is essentially one of moral haz-
ard that introduces considerable uncertainty on the benefit side of the program. This uncer-
tainty is not addressed by any mechanism in the program and it may need to be resolved. In
the meantime, EQIP is one among several valuable options of programs available for natural
resource conservation. The existence of other conservation programs that address habitat
concerns on which EQIP seems to be weak may mitigate the concern surrounding the imple-
mentation of the program.22
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